According to many legal and political scientists the Austrian Bundesrat is generally considered to be a paradigmatic example of a politically and legally weak second chamber embedded in a strongly centralised federal system. This view is justified. However, there is the need for a more differentiated view with regard to Austria's federal system and its second chamber.
Introduction
According to many legal and political scientists the Austrian Bundesrat is generally considered to be a paradigmatic example of a politically and legally weak second chamber embedded in a strongly centralised federal system (see Schäffer 1999 : 38, Fallend 2015 .
This view is justified. However, as I will explain later throughout this paper, there is the need for a more differentiated view with regard to Austria's federal system and its second 
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elected by an ever-growing number of (male) people, resulting in a general electoral system in 1907, and on the other hand the Herrenhaus with deputies of the clerical and aristocratical elites, installed by the emperor.
In terms of legislation, both chambers had more or less the same legal position. A law passed by the first chamber needed the consent of both the Herrenhaus and the Emperor; it can thus be said that there was 'perfect bicameralism' in Austria from 1867 to 1918.
Notwithstanding this, Austria-Hungary was not a federation in a strict sense, but the empire had rather moved in the direction of a decentralised unitary state (Karlhofer 2017: 12) .
After the democratic revolution of 1918, the Herrenhaus was abolished, as the previous system with one chamber of parliament, which was not democratically legitimated, was unacceptable.
In a federal system the second chamber might regain a certain function, namely in representing the interest of the Länder and participating in federal law-making. After the breakdown of 1918, in the course of the debates between the Central Government and the Länder on the future structure of the Republic, the vision of a second chamber, the Bundesrat, was soon under discussion.
Kelsen's and other experts' views on the Bundesrat as an organ of the Federation
Hans Kelsen is generally considered the author of the Austrian Federal Constitution. A detailed discussion of this thesis, however, would exceed the scope of this paper.
Undoubtedly, Kelsen played an important role in the process of developing the Austrian Federal Constitution, namely as an advisor of the Government and Parliament in these matters (Schefbeck 1997: 317) .
Across Kelsen´s drafts (there were about six) the role of the Bundesrat differs significantly. Obviously, he tried to propose several alternatives concerning the degree of Länder participation in federal legislation via a second chamber of Parliament. Regarding the composition of the Bundesrat, it is remarkable that Kelsen proposed in Drafts I, II and IV that the members of the Bundesrat should be elected by the Land parliaments, which corresponds with the provision of Art. 34 par. 1 B-VG, which eventually entered into Similarly, the draft of Mayr, a Tyrolean historical scientist, who soon after became federal chancellor of Austria for several months, provided in various options that a resolution of the Nationalrat, repeating its origin bill would need the consent of 3/4 respectively 2/3 in the Nationalrat, respectively. a referendum, if the resolution would find only a simple majority (Kathrein 1983: 17) .
Positions of political parties
During the political negotiations that preceded the enactment of the Federal Even though the Bundesrat was organised in a way that it could be called a chamber representing interests of the Länder, it could not gain a strong position. This is often (somewhat incorrectly) referred to as the 'congenital defect' of the Bundesrat (Schäffer 1999: 38) . It was clear from the beginning that the Bundesrat was an imperfect organ of the federation. Danneberg, deputy of the Social Democrats, who was responsible for the compromise, described the competences of the Bundesrat in his speech from September 29 1920 -two days before the Federal Constitution entered into force -as follows:
We still consider the Bundesrat as a totally unnecessary institution. But as it was not possible for us, to prevent it, its competences are reduced to a minimum and its composition will not be able to prevent legislation (of the Nationalrat) from entering into force. (Bußjäger 2004: 6) .
Evolution of the legal status of the Bundesrat

Composition of the Bundesrat
In Austria, as well as in many other federal systems, a geometric system prevails: the number of members of Land representatives to the Bundesrat differs according to the population size of each Land. Art. 34 B-VG provides that the Land with the largest population is represented by 12 members and the other Länder proportionally by as many members as reflects their respective proportion size. These provisions have not changed since 1920.
Rights and Instruments
The Federal Furthermore, the Bundesrat was entitled to submit bills via the Federal Government to the Nationalrat, which was free to take these bills into consideration or not.
Further, veto-rights of the Bundesrat were provided in two contexts. The first, in Art. The Nationalrat overruled the veto of the Bundesrat in all cases, which not only confirmed Danneberg's prophecy, but also underlined that the Bundesrat was not able to gain any significance in political proceedings.
Second Republic since 1945: Nothing has changed
Even after the November 1945 re-establishment of the Federal Constitution, and elections at the federal and Land level, the Bundesrat played only a minor role as a weak chamber. In fact, the Bundesrat was rarely recognised as a lawmaker. According to Gamper, In general, it can be noted that the Bundesrat not had the best reputation. As Gamper wrote, on the one hand, the Federal Council is so much less recognized than the National Council that is directly elected by the federal citizens and thus comes to the fore much more. Neither, moreover, is the 
The other side of the coin
While some would frankly argue that the bundesrat is worthless from a federal perspective, its veto-right concerning modifications of the Federal Constitution has been sufficient to prevent more severe damage to the Lands' competences. Another point is that the Bundesrat actively participates on the subsidiarity monitoring of projects of the European Commission; here the Austrian Bundesrat is one of the most active chambers of national parliaments of the European Union.
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the Bundesrat initiated a modification of the Federal Constitution in order to strengthen and facilitate municipal cooperation in 2011.
Another initiative concerning the abolishment of various veto-rights of the Federal Government on Land organisation and vice versa will soon be discussed in the parliament.
Finally, it must not be overlooked that in the present situation the Social Democrats and members of the Green Party could make use of the minority right of one-third of the members of the Bundesrat to call for a referendum on modifications of the Federal Constitution. The Social Democratic Party has announced its intent to make use of this instrument, which has never been exercised over nearly a hundred years.
Ideas of reform
Even though the deficits of the present system are obvious, ideas for reform of the These ideas for the reform of the power of the Bundesrat are insufficient. As long the members of the Bundesrat do not act as representatives of the Länder, instead of following party discipline, the strengthening of the rights and instruments of the Bundesrat will be insufficient. Thus, a reform of the Bundesrat must have both aspects in mind:
Composition and organisational structure of the Bundesrat on the one side and powers and rights of the Bundesrat on the other side.
Conclusion
The Austrian Bundesrat was a historical compromise between two parties with profound disagreement on the necessity of a second chamber of parliament. All deputies who took part in the decision on the Federal Constitution in September 1920 were aware of the fact that the Bundesrat would never be able to play an essential role in lawmaking.
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Since 1920 the Austrian Bundesrat has remained a legally and politically weak institution. The Bundesrat has self-restricted the exercise of its rights and instruments, and was not able to emancipate itself from the Nationalrat.
On the other hand, there is proof of a slight movement into the direction of the legal strengthening of the Bundesrat since 1984. Nevertheless, the Bundesrat remains under the dominance of the First Chamber. A greater role, reasonably independent from influences from the Nationalrat and party discipline, could only be reached through subsidiarity monitoring in European context. Over the past years many reform ideas have been formulated. The present Federal Government and the political parties, however, seem to have lost any vision for the future of the Bundesrat.
The Austrian Federal Constitution will celebrate its hundredth anniversary in two years.
At least until then the situation will remain unchanged. 
